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Strategic survey of Hormuz Peace Endeavour: Challenges & Requirements

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Abstract

The formation of a common security system in the Persian gulf region with the participation of the states of the Persian Gulf and far from any foreign forces has been always part of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, The President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, having realized this necessity and has proposed the Hormuz Peace Endeavour (known as HOPE)for the Hormuz Community in September of 2019 in order to provide a framework for reaching sustainable regional security agreement in the Hormuz community. Although, this idea was positive, endogenous, holistic and subject-oriented and proposed the gathering of states without any preconditions for resolving regional issues with the secondary role of world powers and under the auspices of the United Nations, but due to the deep-rooted and long-standing challenges of the region and the new balance of power, as well as the representation of the nature of global security in the Persian Gulf, it is still not welcomed and viewed with pessimism. Despite the cultural similarities and common needs between the countries of the Persian Gulf, the presence of foreign forces is an obstacle to achieving a security order for cooperation between the countries of the region. The Hormuz Peace Endeavour has the ability and capacity to lay the groundwork for a cooperative security order. This study seeks to express the strategic challenges and solutions to achieve the Hormuz Peace Endeavour.

Keywords: Hormuz Peace, Security, Persian Gulf, Conflict Resolution, Peace.

JEL Classification: Jurisprudence - Law - Criminal and Criminology - International Law - Private Law

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1. Introduction

The Persian Gulf region is one of the most important and strategic regions which has the greatest impact on Iran's security. Due to its global importance, historically, internationalizing the country's position, has created opportunities and threats for Iran (Hafeznia & Rabiee, 2013). Geopolitical, geostrategic and especially geo-economics attractions of the Persian Gulf has become many grounds for the world powers to pay attention to this region and make their security dependent on Persian Gulf security. Furthermore, in order to influence regional developments and secure its interests and security, Iran needs to establish relations with its neighbors in the Persian Gulf region in its foreign policy strategy

since Iran and the States of the Persian Gulf region are located in the same geographical area. In order to increase, maintain and reach power, as well as to achieve the desired benefits and security, it is necessary for Iran to create security in the region through collective cooperation (Ghasemi & Salehi, 2008). In this regard, after the Islamic Revolution, Iran has sought an endogenous security system with the cooperation of States of the Persian Gulf region, without the involvement of non-regional actors, and has repeatedly presented its plans and proposals in international and regional forums during 1990s and 2000s. Accordingly, the establishment of a common security system in the region with the participation of States of the Persian Gulf and the without the interference of any foreign forces, has always been part of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Zweiri & Suleiman, 2019, p. 2). In this regard, Hassan Rouhani, upon his election in 2013 presidential election in Iran, sought to establish a regional security system. He has proposed the Hormuz Peace Endeavour (known as HOPE) with realizing this necessity and Role-playing in the relations of the new power in the region as well as the collective interests of all parties, in late September 2019 to provide the basic principles for a comprehensive regional agreement in the Hormuz community. The main question before this study is what strategic challenges does this peace plan face and what are the solutions to achieve it?.

The need to achieve peace and security in the Persian Gulf

The Hormuz Peace Endeavour (hereinafter HOPE) means maximizing interactions with the coastal States of the Persian Gulf. The coastal States of the Persian Gulf are divided into two groups, i.e. the north and the south. Both rows of the south and north States of the Persian Gulf are characterized by their high dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, the positive political atmosphere and the safety of communications through the Strait of Hormuz play a key role in the lives of these states. It can be argued that except Iran and Oman, other states in question, supply more than 90% of their needs through the Strait of Hormuz (Elahi, 2012)

Peace in a general sense means the absence of war. This minimal interpretation of peace has been interpreted by lawyers as "negative peace" (Askary, Poriia Khosravy, 2017, p. 241). Regarding the negative peace, it defines a state in which war does not rule. Peace used to have the same meaning in international relations before the establishment of the United Nations. But along with the concept of "negative peace", one must also point out the concept of "positive peace", in which, in addition to the absence of war, justice is needed to create peace. Positive peace, according to a simple definition, is "respect for human rights, justice and non-violence in international relations, whether structural violence or direct violence" (Askary, Poriia Khosravy, 2017, p. 241). In today's world, peace is not only seen as a need of human beings and societies, but also as a right for human beings to live in an atmosphere full of peace and tranquility (Ashrafi, 2015, p. 85).

The United Nations has expanded the concept of peace to include "the establishment of an international order based on justice." Therefore, from this point of view, not only the lack of war does not mean the



establishment and continuation of peace, but also any action that is in conflict with justice may cause the threat to peace and its violation. In fact, in the positive sense peace means "calm conditions, carefree and free from anxiety, no conflict, and in general, the existence of comprehensive conditions is safe" (Jamshidi, 2018, p. 5). An important concern of the international community after the end of wars and armed conflicts is the establishment of peace and, more importantly, the establishment of sustainable peace. Transition from war to sustainable peace has always been difficult and complicated. Often, or at least in half of the cases, we are witnessing the reverse of armed conflicts, both international and domestic. The creation of such a peace needs to be consolidated and strengthened (Begzadeh, 2007, p. 13).

The primary goal of any security strategy, framework, alliance, or institution—unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral—is to provide order in what is otherwise an inherently anarchical international environment made up of individual nations and groups with conflicting as well as overlapping interests, values, and ideologies. And the principal factor of any enduring security order is that it is perceived as providing cultural, material, psychological, and even spiritual goods: justice, freedom, prosperity, respect for one's identity or culture by others, a general sense of safety, and other such intangible but very real factors in human life (Kraig, 2006, pp. 1–2). Therefore, any order that is not in creating these benefits is not considered order ((Ebrahimifar, 2010, p. 11) In this regard, many models of security orders have been defined and experienced in terms of thought and action, which according to the environmental and political conditions of the regions, have been considered by the foreign policy of countries, among which can be the models of regional security, Collective defense, Collective security, collective security, common security, inclusive security, and cooperative security. In the Persian Gulf region, among these models, the cooperative group-based regional order can be more effective; Because this type of model can be a combination of all common patterns in the world and be effective and workable due to the environmental complexities of the Persian Gulf and the prevailing conditions. The term of cooperative security often simply means that states will work together to solve common problems. (Mihalka, 2005, p. 113) Explaining this model, like common security and comprehensive security, cooperative security, in addition to extending the concept of "security" beyond traditional military concerns, which include economic, social, and environmental concerns, to deepen the understanding of reciprocity. In this type of regional security, states try to work together instead of competing. Collaborative security seeks to create the tools to solve challenges (Baylis et al., 2011, p. 254) challenges such as having different and even conflicting views on how to secure regional security, the sovereignty of different government systems, the concern of the southern Gulf states about Iran's high power and geopolitical development, the divergence of views on sovereignty in Iraq, The Middle East peace issue, the atmosphere of public mistrust in the Persian Gulf, foreign opposition, possible resistance by regional governments in the southern Gulf states, US military presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, territorial and border disputes between countries in the region, and inadequate mentality (Zarei & Mousavi shidid, Mehdi Solgi, 2020, p. 37) Therefore, the Hormoz Peace approach can be evaluated with a cooperative security model.

The States of the Persian Gulf have vital common interests in the freedom of navigation through Hormuz, and this feature can be the basis for unity and convergence between the states on both sides of the Gulf or the Strait. In the meantime, there is no doubt that the HOPE will be strategic importance for Iran that has a much wider economy and has a superior force in geopolitical, cultural, social dimension. In the shadow of the HOPE, in addition to ensuring and managing the security of communications, Iran can also form a real structure with its leadership and acting, which is land- Sea based, and in this way Get rid of the problem of the current Political impasse. Moreover, Iran like any other state, has its own interests, policies, strategies and perceptions. From Tehran's point of view, the current situation in the Persian Gulf is the result of



various interconnected factors, including the fact that almost all previous projects, policies and efforts to establish security, peace and stability in the region had failed. from Iran 's point of view, these have failed largely because these have excluded major regional powers, especially Iran. In addition, they are not endogenous plans of the region, but imposed by outsiders pursuing their own specific interests with little consideration for the realities in the region and thus lacking in basic and mutually endorsed principles and assurances (Khatibzadeh, 2020, p. 4). Based on these past experiences, it is apparent that only inclusive and cooperative frameworks can succeed. The region needs a realistic security framework that mirrors the new power relations in the region and is not based on old parameters. As perceived in Iran, there is an absolute need for such a comprehensive regional package for cooperation, which is reflected in Iran's proposal for a Hormuz Community embedded in the (HOPE) initiative (Khatibzadeh, 2020, p. 4).

Hormuz Peace Initiative

The President of Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, in his speech at the seventy -fourth session of the General Assembly, September 25, 2019, launched the Hormuz Peace Endeavour, known as HOPE .On the same day, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided more details on the initiative in his statement to the Security Council. Iran links the Peace of Hormuz to paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 598 and uses it as a legal basis, as Resolution 598 was a base that the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq agreed to cease war in 1988. paragraph 8 of this resolution emphasizes on the need for a United Nations effort to ensure regional security and stability through consultation with Iran and Iraq and with other States of the region, because during this war, Persian Gulf is witnessing the escalation of oil tanker wars, including tankers of other States in the Strait of Hormuz that affected the security of all the states in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, in the HOPE, Iran considers the UN responsible for preparing the necessary international umbrella to alleviate the concerns of all states and protect the legitimate interests of the international community and its member states. That means other actors on the world stage, including the United States, Europe, Russia and China, can play a secondary role in this project. Therefore, in the HOPE Proposal, Iran seeks to provide endogenous, holistic, subject-oriented and inclusive plan that would – through an elaborate process of consultation and inclusive participation – allow Governments, private sectors, academia, civil society and other stakeholders of all eight coastal States of the Persian Gulf ¹ – the Hormuz Community – to join forces and make use of their local wisdom, expertise and experiences to cooperatively tackle the very serious challenges currently arising from such plagues as terrorism, extremism, sectarianism, poverty, environmental degradation, expansionism and interventionism.

In addition, HOPE Emphasized on fundamental principles as Respect for the sovereign equality of all States, territorial integrity and political independence, good neighborliness, non-aggression, non-interference, the peaceful settlement of disputes, rejection of the threat and use of force, arms control, non -proliferation, energy security and freedom of navigation. Iran deems commitment to and observance of these principles – coupled with the methodical initiation of a process of rapprochement through dialogue, confidence-building measures and mutual respect – as the only realistic means to tackle current chronic and forthcoming challenges and to guarantee sustainable peace and development for the region. Furthermore, this initiative – which can begin with or lead to the signing of a Hormuz community non-intervention and non -aggression pact.

Hormuz Peace Endeavour and leading obstacles

¹ Namely: Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Iraq, Saudi Arabia ,Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.



there is an agreement among experts about the current state of affairs in the Persian gulf region, it is that time is sensitive, context is complex and uncertainty is widespread. Indeed, from the Palestinian crisis to the ones in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, the region is deeply entrapped in unsettled disputes and conflicts, reflecting intra-regional rivalries and foreign intervention. "These crises are developing at an accelerated rate and the spillovers into neighbouring states and regions"(Khatibzadeh, 2020, p. 3). The past four decades indicate that cultural, social and economic relations between Iran and its regional neighbors have not yielded a real improvement in political relations, or even security coordination. This does not negate the existence of some exceptional cases between Iran and Oman or Iran and Iraq after 2003, but the general context indicates a state of distrust in Iran's relations with its neighbors. Despite cultural commonalities such as history or religion that should have achieved some sort of convergence, the regional states view such commonalities as tools that Iran is trying to exploit in order to strengthen its influence and hegemony in the region (Zweiri & Suleiman, 2019, p. 4). Therefore, any security plan and idea is not effective if it is not accompanied by a change in the political discourse of the member states, because political discourses can create the grounds for the formation of political will for convergence; As if in recent years, what has caused a gap between the states of the region, has been the lack of political will to converge and cooperate.

Furthermore, it should not be neglected that the marginalization of the irreplaceable role of foreign actors in the region, due to the strong security dependence of the states of region on foreign powers, is one of the important factors that they do not join the Hormuz Peace Endeavour. it seems impossible to reach a coalition (Repetowicz, 2020) Hence, what is presented as a serious impediment to the realization of Iran's security plans in the region is the level of Iran's relationship with the West, specially the United States; Because from the west point of view, the Persian Gulf is a strategic and important region and therefore they try to maintain their presence in the region by creating problems and creating crises. During 2019, escalating tensions around the Strait of Hormuz showed that the stability of the Persian Gulf is not simply a regional problem, but that foreign powers in the region have the potential to turn it into a global problem. They make it clear that the formation of a collective security will be difficult until Tehran and the West can resolve their long-standing problems and agree on or overcome common interests in the region. This is the most important challenge for the Hormuz peace plan (Zweiri & Suleiman, 2019)

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the issue of Israel. Although the HOPE focuses on the eight coastal States of the Persian Gulf, including Iran and Iraq, along with six GCC member states, the HOPE cannot be considered without considering Israel for two reasons. These two reasons, namely emphasis of the Hormuz plan on the Disarmament of the region from weapons of mass destruction and the other, the security connection between the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, which can be seen in the normalization of relations between some states in the Persian Gulf, which can be serious obstacle for joining the States of the Persian Gulf to the Hormuz Peace. Political developments in the Persian Gulf region, the Arab region and even the Islamic world have shown that joint actions have not led to the promotion of the minimum level of cooperation between the member states of non-regional organizations. Joint action of organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab League or the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), despite various commonalities and unprecedented common interests of member states, did not help the interests of the people under these regional organizations to converge and create a united front. Qatar blockade in 2017 can be taken into account as the example by the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain) and other Arabic states (Egypt). In 1990, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq. All of these events emphasize that political interests and cultural commonalities have not contributed to encouraging member states to strengthen a culture of dialogue, coordination and respect for their different policies in order to safeguard common interests, and they have not reached a comprehensive and endogenous coalition in this region.



Discussion about the cultural or economic cooperation of communities in the region cannot be made apart from the role of Sovereignty; Because in this region, the state is the main player and has a decisive role in all internal and external relations. Clearly, the success of such collaborations depends on the nature of state in the region, which encompasses all economic, social, and cultural spheres and relies on a tribal structure that with its pre modern behavior wants to play a role in the modern world. So, any plan to change the status quo must pass through the channel of such states. Distrust between states or their level of conflict, as well as the lack of real development in some states and the growing gap between society and the state, along with the interactions of the domestic political scene, which indicates a state of instability, Achieving levels of cooperation in the cultural, social and economic spheres seems almost limited, if not impossible.

Reactions and atmosphere after the HOPE

Iran's relations with the GCC members have been strained for many years. The six GCC member states have largely ignored HOPE as a regional security initiative, and none of them has been willing to start Security cooperation with Tehran. Saudi Arabia, the largest and the most influential GCC member state and one of the major powers in the Arab and Sunni Islamic world, has completely ignored the HOPE. Diplomatic relations between Tehran and Riyadh, which were severed in early 2016 following an attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad, have not been re-established. The rhetoric between Iran and Saudi Arabia continues. Saudi and US officials have blamed Iran for attacks on the Aramco oil facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia in September 2019. Iran denies the allegations, saying the attacks were carried out by Yemeni Houthis, which according to Tehran were in response to Saudi attacks on Yemen. However, a June 2020 report by U.N. experts released by U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres confirmed that the missiles and drones used to attack Saudi oil facilities and airports were conducted from Iranian territory. "In the face of such evidence, it has been difficult for Iran to absolve itself of responsibility for the attacks. In the meantime, Iran's support for the Houthis in Yemen and Saudi Arabia's support for the U.N.-backed Yemeni government has kept both Riyadh and Tehran bogged down in the most destructive conflict in the Middle East"(Vaisi, 2020).

Kuwait, in turn, has taken a different approach. It maintains close ties with the United States and is one of the most important US military bases in the region, While refraining from open tensions with Tehran. As part of the start of the Hormuz project, Iran called for the withdrawal of trans-regional forces, including the United States, from the Persian Gulf. But Kuwait as a Iraq and Iran's neighbor (two major regional powers) considers Iranas contrary to its defense and security needs. Kuwait remains concerned about the future military plans of its two neighbors and sees the US military presence on its Territory as a strategic deterrent against Tehran and Baghdad. Qatar, which has the best relations with Iran among the GCC member states after Oman, has not welcomed the HOPE in practice. After Qatar's embargo by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt, and an economic blockade was imposed on Doha in 2017, Iran helped quickly, including opening Iranian airspace to Qatari commercial flights and delivering food from Iranian ports to Doha. The Emir (king) of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, visited Tehran in early 2020. This was an important event, because none of GCC leaders have visited the Iranian capital in recent years. He was there to reassure Iranians that Qatar has no desire to pursue a hostile policy towards Iran. However, in terms of Qatari military and security cooperation, it prefers the United States to Iran. Doha has rejected Tehran's offer of security and defense cooperation within the framework of the HOPE and like Kuwait, has preferred to maintain strategic military and security relations with the United States. While Qatar hosted the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in Al Udeid Air Base, Iran announced CENTCOM as a terrorist organization - a move that in retaliation for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist group by the United States.

Despite the above, what has seriously challenged the peace in Hormuz is the decisions of Bahrain and the UAE to normalize relations with the Israel. One day before the signing ceremony in Washington, Rashid bin



Abdullah Al Khalifa, Bahrain's Interior Minister, referring to the Iranian behavior in the region, stated that Iran was a constant threat to its national security. Iran's Senior political and military officials have accused, the UAE and Bahrain of treason for normalizing relations with the Israel. This dispute clearly contradicts the goals of the HOPE. There are even whispers of Oman's desire to normalize relations with the Israel. Although Saudi Arabia has said it will not establish relations with the Israel until Palestine is established, it has allowed Israel's planes to fly to the UAE from its airspace territory for the first time. All these developments indicating a new and evolving security environment in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf - An environment that is increasingly to the detriment of Iran.

Representation of the Iran's regional power status through the Hormuz Peace

In the midst of the HOPE, Iran's activities in the axis of resistance showed the superior hand of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the eyes of the states in the region, Iran had supported Syria and Iraq against ISIS and other armed opposition groups, preventing the fall of those governments and eliminating ISIS. Also in Lebanon, Iran was mediator for establishing cabinet Under the influence of Hezbollah. While in Yemen, pro-Iranian Houthis controlled Sanaa, the capital. Iran not only reached the Israel 's border in southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip through its proxy groups, but was also accused of supporting the Houthis in attacking the Aramco oil facility. These showed that Iran has become a regional power that can play the role of a regional mediator in line with its policies in the region and challenge the trans-regional powers and use its region influence to address international concerns and issues. With regard to world powers, Iran challenged US power for the first time in the region's history by shooting down its drone after violation of Iranian airspace, and the United States was unable to respond to Iran's defense.

The confrontation of Iran against the British tanker was another case that showed the superiority of Iran's power in the region, and all this shows the representation of Iran's power, which had a message for the states of the region. However, with the beginning of 2020, the situation changed completely. General Soleimani, the unrivaled and victorious commander of the resistance and the destroyer of ISIS, was assassinated by the United States, and Iran fired missiles at the Ain al-Assad base in Self-defense.

Israel has entered the political, economic and security environment of the Persian Gulf. Israel's businessmen traveled to the region, and diplomats are following suit. Iran, which just proposed the idea of security cooperation with its Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf, is now witnessing that the States of the Persian Gulf are pursuing political, economic and security cooperation with its regional enemy, namely Israel. Economically, Iran is currently under sanctions. It is not in a position to influence its southern Arab neighbors.

Many Arab countries, mostly Sunni, feels that Iran is building a Shiite crescent and intends to interfere in their internal affairs. Statements by the Arab League, OIC, GCC shows that these concerns are widespread and not limited to specific State. Therefore, these states, centered on Saudi Arabia, considers the HOPE as the agenda of Iran's regions to dominate the region and influence their hegemony in the region to pursue its policies. King Salman of Saudi Arabia, in a statement in response to Zarif's statement that Iran should adopt a balanced regional policy, said "Our experience with the Iranian regime has taught us that partial solutions and appeasement did not stop its threats to international peace and security"(Saudi King Denounces Iran's 'Expansionism' in Fiery UN Speech, 2020). in addition, the Saudi Foreign Minister at the UN General Assembly called on the international community to put maximum pressure on Iran, arguing that the best way to control the Islamic Republic is to cut off its financial sources ('Terrorist Iranian Regime' Must Be Checked; Saudi Foreign Minister Urges Financial Pressure, 2019).



Lack of consensus on security in the Persian Gulf and the presentation of rival plans

Like Iran, regional and foreign actors have presented various concepts and proposals of collective security and have their own orientation towards the security of the Persian Gulf region. The United States in order to expand its regional influence with "maximum pressure" on Iran seeks to build a security alliance in the region, commonly referred to as the "Arab NATO". (Haghirian & Zaccara, 2019). In this regard, the United States twice in 2019 proposed the formation of a coalition in the West Asian region; For the first time, in the early summer of 2019, under the pretext of securing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, they discussed the creation of a naval and military alliance in the Persian Gulf, a plan that was not welcomed by their western and eastern allies, including Germany, France and Japan and South Korea came forward and raised it a second time after the attack on the Aramco oil facility.

Saudi Arabia and its allies, including the U.S., some European countries, and other Arab regimes such as the UAE and Bahrain, overtly seeking to contain Iran's power and continue complying with the U.S. to weaken Iran politically and economically. Of course, Other coastal countries such as Kuwait, Oman and Qatar have softer stance towards Iran and in any circumstances seek Iran's participation in the regional security issues. Yet, for the sake of preserving their Arab identity and unity and maintaining hold on power domestically, they are more inclined to take the side of Saudi Arabia in any regional security system (Barzegar, 2019). In contrast, Russia's ambitious 2019 proposal envisages the participation of the U.S., Russia, China, and Europe in an OSCE-like collective security architecture for the Middle East the goal of which is more to establish a regional security organization with trans-regional effects in the long-term (Grajewski, 2020). China, India and Turkey are similarly trying to adjust and balance in some way their geopolitical interests with the two main actors in the region; namely, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Of course, each of these countries has its own views on regional issues.

But according to their capabilities, available resources, and strategic constraints, they cannot and do not want to enter into meaningful alliances that could be to their detriment. These states are trying to adapt their interests to the current developments in the region. These use the evolving regional environment to balance their geopolitical interests and seek to influence the geopolitical interests of the region in the favor of their geopolitical interests.

Requirements for the realization of HOPE

The implementation of HOPE and the accession of the states of the region to it, requires actions and contexts initiated by Iran in the Persian Gulf region in order to gain the trust and provide the ground for acceptance for other actors in the region. The most important of them are mentioned.

Emphasis on the areas of convergence of States

In order to implement the HOPE and any kind of security model, Iran should emphasize on the convergent factors that are the common points of Iran with all members of the Persian Gulf, and in this regard, take steps towards comprehensive unions or subject-oriented entities. Areas of Iran's convergence with these countries are common customs, common geography, mono-product economy, their dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, achieving security, environmental impasse and water crisis and environmental consequences, each of them can be a window for convergence of States of the Persian Gulf with Iran. Since HOPE emphasizes on the principles and goals of a comprehensive issue, can be steps to achieve the desired model by emphasizing these areas.



Trust building and Desecuritization in relationships

Obviously, if Iran wants to change the calculations in the GCC, it must do more trust building (Ebrahimifar, 2006). This trust building should be done in both cultural and political dimensions. Political from the perspective that the Islamic Republic in the region seeks nothing but the unity of Muslims against the Dominating system (Ramazani, 1990). With a sustainable dialogue as far as possible to play an active mediating and neutral role in resolving tensions and conflicts between countries and to seek authoritative peace; this means that it did not act passively in regional issues, and at the same time did not neglect security (defense, military, food, economic, health) and endogenous deterrents. Culturally, while accepting cultural differences, policy-making should be handled in such a way that cultural differences are not challenged by the propaganda of states are opposed to Iran and those with geopolitical concerns and interests in the region. As far as possible, the duplication of Arab-Ajam (non-Arab) and Shiite-Sunni can be prevented, whether in the media or in the cultural, social and political showcases and tribunals. As far as possible, the idea of Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought strengthened and expanded whether in practice or in theory. In this regard, the capacity of seminaries and great scholars should be used.

Economic needs

One of the factors that bring states closer together is the economic factor that make states interdependent based on their gaps and needs. In the Persian Gulf, Iran does not have significant economic interactions with States of the Persian Gulf. In fact, Iran's distance from them does not create any costs for them (Rahimpour, 2010). Therefore, Iran must understand their economic needs in order to converge with them in order to create dependency and creating needs. Creating Economic need is one of the key foundations of countries in the region close to Iran. Hence, a significant portion of Iran's attention to establishing a calm environment on the southern fringe should be focused on expanding economic interactions. Undoubtedly, a key part of success in this area requires the improvement and development of communication infrastructure.

There are many economic fields in Iran that can be the basis of political interactions. Iran's transit and communication position is one of the components that can be connected to the Caspian Basin, the Caucasus and Central Asia with the states of the Persian Gulf region from an economic point of view (Sayari, 2008). Iran is the contact point and connection of north and south together and the connection of South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan and Afghanistan with the Persian Gulf. This will make the geopolitical issue of Iran's energy and gas and oil transmission lines play like a bridge. Therefore, in this regard the establishment of economic organizations and institutions can be helpful. Another economic dimension of Iran is its gas resources, which can be effective in economic relations with Oman and the UAE and provide good economic infrastructure. Another economic field that exists is tourism, especially pilgrimage tourism, which can be a source of economic impact on both sides of the Persian Gulf. Economic interactions and the formation of economic base's organizations and entity in each region are the best and most appropriate option for cooperation, coexistence and convergence of states and can be the basis for achieving HOPE.

Attention to facilitating cultural exchanges and relations between Hormuz communities

It seems the cooperation model Iran endeavors to promote through the HOPE looks similar to the Helsinki Initiative. It can be said that Helsinki means a smart region and a cultural base (Zweiri & Suleiman, 2019, p. 3). Because its purpose is to create common ground for development in the economic, political, social and



cultural fields. Therefore, according to Target and emphasis on societies, one of the requirements of the HOPE, is to pay special attention to the field of culture and cultural exchanges and the relations between them. This issue, in turn, will be reflected in the promotion of the role of communities, the possibility of their proper functioning and the reduction of conflicts and tensions. This initiative targets policymakers, leaders, universities, research institutes, libraries and researchers.

Conclusion

Although the Hormuz Peace Endeavour was not welcomed by the coastal States of the Persian Gulf and none of them decided to cooperate with tangible security with Tehran, but the presentation of this positive and more realistic plan by Iran under any circumstances and obvious and hidden goals is positive step and it is considered forward for Iran's position and regional security. Because for the first time in the region, a state presented a holistic, thematic, comprehensive and endogenous plan to bring states together without any preconditions to resolve regional issues with the secondary role of world powers under the auspices of the United Nations.

This should have been considered and welcomed by the states of the region, but so far the states of the region due to traditional and long-standing obstacles and lack of independent political will that have been deprived of the spirit of self-confidence for years and as a chronic disease prevents the formation of an endogenous regional security cooperation system. The history of developments in the region has shown that progress in prosperity, security and stability in the region is not possible in a non-comprehensive way that eliminates Iran's participation.

On the other hand, the fate of the Hormuz Peace Initiative, in addition to Iran's ability to take concrete steps to build confidence with its Arab neighbors, depends on the support of the international community, especially the United States. It is clear that most GCC member's states cannot ignore their military partnership with the United States, Because there is no real local capacity to ensure their security and political interests, they cannot have independent will against the world powers and therefore the nature of the security of the Persian Gulf is represented and interpreted globally. Nevertheless, Iran can look for a way for cooperation and convergence of the states in the region, in an atmosphere far from the current tensions and hostilities, by relying on the HOPE and by emphasizing and trying to meet its requirements. Hence, the Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE) can become a trustworthy operating system instead of a community solution that Addresses both specific challenges among States of the Persian Gulf and broader security issues in the Persian Gulf through sustainable dialogue.

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