Abstract

This article examines the comparative analysis of the criminal liability of the coercer (mukreh) in felonies between Imami jurisprudence and the Islamic Penal Code of 2013. Although criminal liability is based on free will, coercion, as a factor that removes or weakens will, significantly impacts this responsibility. This research aims to accurately analyze and compare jurisprudential and legal perspectives on this issue, with an approach focusing on the position of the "Aqwa'iyyat Sabab" (stronger cause) theory and clarifying the role of concurrent causes in determining the extent of the coercer's liability.

The findings of this study indicate that in both Imami jurisprudence and the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, coercion can affect criminal liability in various ways, and the "Aqwa'iyyat Sabab" theory serves as a crucial analytical basis in determining the coercer's liability (especially in cases of complete deprivation of will) and in differentiating between the cause (sabab) and the direct perpetrator (mobasher). Furthermore, an examination of the regulations within the Islamic Penal Code of 2013, particularly the articles related to the concurrence of causes and direct perpetration, suggests that the legislator has also adopted principles similar to the "Aqwa'iyyat Sabab" theory in its approach. This research, employing an analytical-comparative methodology, not only provides a comprehensive framework for analyzing the criminal liability of the coercer in felonies but also addresses existing practical challenges. Its ultimate goal is to offer recommendations for improving judicial practice and achieving criminal justice in this domain.