In recent years, crime prediction has gained a significant position in preventive criminal policy; however, from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence and the fundamental principles of criminal law, there is still no consensus regarding the limits of its legitimacy.

This ambiguity led the present study to focus on two levels of prediction - primary and tertiary - and to examine the issue from jurisprudential and legal viewpoints. Using an analytical–critical method, the research addresses whether these two forms of prediction are evaluated similarly in Islamic jurisprudence and criminal law, and to what extent Opportunity Theory and Rational Choice Theory can provide a reliable basis for their legitimacy.

The collection and analysis of data drawn from library sources, classical jurisprudential texts, and criminological findings indicate that tertiary prediction - especially when used as a basis for criminal decisions - is incompatible with principles such as the rule of dar’ (presumption of avoidance of punishment), the presumption of innocence, and the prohibition of unwarranted surveillance. In contrast, primary prediction, when applied in non‑criminal domains such as resource allocation or environmental design and accompanied by safeguards such as respect for privacy and avoidance of mere suspicion, enjoys a higher degree of legitimacy.