Abstract

The option of lesion, as a key institution in Islamic jurisprudence and the statutory laws of Iran and Afghanistan, is based on gross inequality in the exchanged values and the injured party’s ignorance of the true price. In Imami jurisprudence, its foundations include "defect in consent," "breach of implied condition," and the "rule of La Darar" (negation of harm). Among Sunni schools, Hanbalis and Malikis accept it based on public interest and La Darar, whereas Hanafis and Shafi'is restrict it to cases of fraud. Evidence suggests that the "negation of harm" theory aligns best with the spirit of Sharia. Conversely, aleatory contracts (such as insurance, mudarabah, ju'alah, and contracts with floating prices), where the extent or realization of the exchanged values is uncertain and dependent on future events, face theoretical challenges. Using a descriptive-analytical and comparative method, this study investigates the applicability of the option of lesion in such contracts. The findings indicate that an absolute approach (either total acceptance or rejection) is incorrect. Instead, a detailed, differentiated approach is required. Specifically, regarding the "extent of parties' contributions and obligations" that can be customarily evaluated at the time of contracting, if there is a gross and unforgivable inequality, lesion is established, and the option of lesion becomes applicable.
Keywords: Jurisprudential Foundations of Option, Option of Lesion, Defect in Consent, Implied Condition, Rule of La Darar, Aleatory Contract, Comparative Law.