Inflation, as one of the disruptive variables affecting the economic balance of contracts, disturbs the equivalence between contractual considerations and fundamentally alters the real value of monetary obligations. In the Iranian legal system, despite the recognition of the principle of the binding force of contracts, inflation has created serious challenges in the enforcement of obligations and highlighted the need to reconsider the possibility of judicial intervention for adjusting contractual duties.

This study, adopting a descriptive–analytical approach, examines the possibility and scope of judicial adjustment of contractual obligations under inflationary conditions and analyzes its jurisprudential and legal foundations in light of principles such as la-zarar (no harm), ‘usr wa haraj (hardship), and the doctrine of change of circumstances.

The central question of the research is how to strike a balance between the principle of contractual stability and the need to preserve commutative justice when facing severe and exceptional inflation, and whether the Iranian legal system has the capacity to recognize an independent mechanism for judicial adjustment. The objectives of the study include explaining the theoretical foundations of adjustment, analyzing the impact of inflation on contractual equilibrium, evaluating Iranian judicial practice, and proposing legislative solutions to address existing gaps.

The findings indicate that although judicial adjustment is not explicitly recognized in Iranian law, there are implicit capacities within general legal and jurisprudential principles that allow for its limited acceptance. However, the absence of clear statutory criteria and a coherent framework has led to a fragmented and case-specific judicial practice lacking theoretical consistency. Consequently, the adjustment of obligations in Iranian law is applied mostly in an indirect and exceptional manner and requires the formulation of clear standards to achieve a balance between legal certainty and economic justice.